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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The deposit in the instant case falls clearly within the classification
of a deposit for a specific purpose. Such deposits under escrow
agreements have generally been held to be specific.2 7 The intention
in such cases seems clear that the ordinary debtor-creditor relation-
ship is not contemplated. Thus, it seems right that the depositor
should be preferred above the general creditors of the bank.
ROBERT A. Hovis.
Bribery-Scope of Official Duties Under Bribery Statute.
Defendant, clerk of the city council, was convicted of bribery
under an indictment alleging that he exerted his influence upon mem-
bers of the council to procure the passage of resolutions settling a
claim against the city and that he stamped, transmitted and certified
these resolutions. The question presented was whether or not de-
fendant's lobbying of the councilmen was within the scope of his
official duties.' Held, the indictment sufficiently related to the clerk's
official duties and his conviction was proper.2
At common law, bribery consisted in the receiving or offering of
any undue reward by or to any person in a public office to influence
his behavior in office.3 Modern statutory definitions4 of the offenses
780 (C. C. A. 5th, 1900) ; Willoughby v. Weinberger, 15 Okla. 226, 79 Pac. 777(1905) ; Orme v. Baker, 74 Ohio St. 337, 78 N. E. 439, 113 Am. St. Rep. 968
(1906).
There is a split of authority concerning the allowance of a preference where
the failed bank has issued a draft covering money on deposit. Morecock v.
Hood, 202 N. C. 321, 162 S. E. 730 (1932) (no preference allowed) ; Bryon v.
Coconut Grove Bank and Trust Co., 132 So. 481 (Fla. 1931) (preference al-
lowed). The better view seems to be not to allow a preference. Note (1932)
26 ILL. L. Ray. 63.
As to whether the proceeds of a check or other paper deposited with a bank
for collection constitutes a trust fund in the hands of a bank which has failed,
see Bogert, Failed Banks, Collection Items, and Trust Preference (1931) 29
MIcH. L. R~v. 545; Turner, Bank Collections-The Direct Routing Practice
(1929) 39 YALE L. J. 468.
'Hudspeth v. Union & Savings Bank, 196 Iowa 706, 195 N. W. 378, 31
A. L. R. 466 (1923); Schulz v. Bank of Harrisonville, 246 S. W. 614 (Mo.
1923) ; Mothersead v. Lewis, 117 Okla. 167, 245 Pac. 550 (1925) ; Lusk Devel-
opment and Improvement Co. v. Giinter, 32 Wyo. 294, 232 Pac. 518 (1925);
Blythe v. Kujawa, 175 Minn. 88, 220 N. W. 168 (1928).
'As to defendant clerk's prescribed duties, see Taylor v. State, 161 S. E.
793, 794 (Ga. 1932).
'Taylor v. State, supra note 1.
'State v. Farris, 229 S. W. 1100 (Mo. App. 1921) ; People v. Coffey, 161
Cal. 433, 119 Pac. 901 (1911); State v. Pritchard, 107 N. C. 921, 12 S. E.
50 (1890) ; 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (Ilth ed. 1912) 2352.
'For a general discussion, see 9 C. J. 406.
As to the North Carolina statute, see N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931)
§4372.
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include all persons whose official conduct is in any way connected
with the administration of government, general or local," whether
judicial,8 legislative,9 executive10 or ministerial. 1 The New York
statute includes any person employed by or acting for the state, or for
any public officer in the business of the state.12 A clerk of a city
council is an "officer of the state" and as such may be guilty of
bribery.' 3
Generally, 14 the cases say that the object sought by the bribe'5
must be an act within the scope of authority or within the official
duties of the officer bribed.' 6 Nevertheless, a number of courts hold
officials who have acted outside the scope of their authority when
they have been acting under color of office."' A broad construction
of the statutory definitions of bribery covers the case where a public
officer acts corruptly in a matter to which he merely bears some official
'Dropps v. U. S., 34 F. (2d) 15 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
"Fromm v. State, 36 Ohio App. 346, 173 N. E. 201 (1930),
'People v. Jackson. 191 N. Y. 293, 84 N. E. 65, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1173,
14 Ann. Cas. 243 (1908).
People v. Emmons, 7 Cal. App. 685, 95 Pac. 1032 (1908).
'State v. Worsham, 154 Wash. 575, 283 Pac. 167 (1929); Territory v.
Wong, 30 Haw. 819 (1929).
Osburn v. State, 160 Tenn. 594, 28 S. W. (2d) 47 (1930).
SN. Y. CoNsoL LAWS, PENAL LAW (1930) §372; People v. Clougher, 246
N. Y. 106, 158 N. E. 38 (1927).
Taylor v. State, 42 Ga. App. 443, 156 S. E. 623 (1931) (facts same as in
instant case, but indictment held defective) ; White v. State, 43 Ga. App. 748,
159 S. E. 897- (1931) (private individual who aided, counseled and conspired
with city councilman held guilty of bribery).
"As to intent of offeror and acceptor of bribe: (1931) 25 ILL. L. REv. 456;
Robinson v. U. S., 32 F. (2d) 505 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) ; Williams v. State, 100
Tex. Cr. Rep. 318, 272 S. W. 484 (1925) ; Williams v. State, 178 Wis. 78, 189
N. W. 268 (1922). As to knowledge by accused of official character of officer
bribed: State v. Beattie, 129 Me. 229, 151 AtI. 427 (1930). Such knowledge
may be by implication. Creswell v. State, 161 Tenn. 290, 30 S. W. (2d) 247
(1930). Failure to convict offeror does not entitle acceptor of bribe to directed
verdict of acquittal. People v. Frye, 248 Mich. 678, 227 N. W. 748 (1929). It
is not bribery where the official act is consummated without prior corrupt intent.
People v. Coffey, supra note 3.
1" Actual tender of bribe is not necessary. Fenwick v. State, 200 Ind. 460,
164 N. E. 632 (1929); People v. Anderson, 75 Cal. App. 365, 242 Pac. 906
(1926).
Taylor v. State, supra note 13, State v. Adcox, 312 Mo. 55, 278 S. W. 990
(1925) ; State v. Adams, 308 Mo. 664, 274 S. W. 21 (1925).
' Fall v. U. S., 49 F. (2d) 506 (App. D. C. 1931) (defendant assumed
authority to proceed with the administration of the petroleum reserves) ; People
v. Clougher, supra note 12 (secretary to health commissioner caused assistant
secretary to procure commissioner's approval of a temporary cream permit);
People v. Anderson, supra note 15 (city marshal had no authority to arrest)
Browne v. U. S., 290 Fed. 870 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923) (defendant army officer
could not make valid sales of war materials) ; People v. Jackson, supra note 8
(coroner assumed to act judicially where he was without jurisdiction).
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relation, though the act be technically beyond the scope of his official
duties.' 8 Similarly, where the conduct of the officer bribed relates to
acts purely discretionary by virtue of his actual relation to an official
matter. 19 The act need not be prescribed by statute,20 but may be
established by usage. 21 It is immaterial whether the act be right or
wrong, where official in form and done under color of office.22
And it is not essential that the act be accomplished. 23
The strict official duties of the defendant in the instant case con-
sisted in his stamping, transmitting and certifying the resolutions. 2 4
The majority opinion brought defendant's lobbying of the councilmen
within the scope of his official duties on the ground that defendant
intended such acts, coupled with his ministerial duties, to accomplish
one general result.2 5 The dissenting opinion contended that de-
fendant was bribed merely for his political influence, that his services
as clerk were not needed and the fact that he happened to be clerk
was but a coincidence. 26 It is submitted that the decision in the
instant case is in line with the judicial authorities which bring within
the statutory definitions of bribery any act related to the official duties
of a public officer and that, as a matter of public policy to protect
taxpayers from unscrupulous officials, 2 7 the court was justified in
holding defendant's acts within the scope of his official duties.
A. E. GARR9'TT, JR.
' People v. Lafaro, 250 N. Y. 336, 165 N. E. 518 (1929); People v.
Clougher, supra note 12.
"People v. Walsh, 138 Misc. 159, 246 N. Y. Supp. 171 (1930) ; People v.
Clougher, supra note 12.
'Daniels v. U. S., 17 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ; U. S. v. Birdsall,
233 U. S. 223, 34 Sup. Ct. 512, 58 L. ed. 930 (1913).
' U. S. v. Birdsall, supra note 20.
"People v. Walsh, supra note 19 (defendant chairman of board of standards
and appeals voted in favor of a legal resolution) ; Daniels v. U. S., supra note
20 (defendant bribed prohibition agent to forego investigation of withdrawals
of bonded liquor); People v. Jackson, supra note 8 (coroner acted without
jurisdiction) ; Turner v. State, 43 Ga. App. 799, 160 S. E. 509 (1931) (matter
not legally pending before city council). Vote of councilman need not be upon
enforceable measure. York v. State, 42 Ga. App. 439, 156 S. E. 733 (1931).
As to defective appointment of officer: State v. Wynne, 118 N. C. 1206, 24
S. E. 216 (1896).
Curtis v. State, 113 Ohio St. 187, 148 N. E. 834 (1925).
Taylor v. State, supra note 1, at 794.
Taylor v. State, supra note 1, at 803.
"Taylor v. State, supra note 1, at 806.
"Fromm v. State, supra note 7, at 204.
